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growth and higher rates of criminal 
offending.2 In short, the empirical 
evidence suggests that substantial rates of 
child poverty reduce a nation’s prosperity. 
Hence, on economic grounds alone there is 
a case for seeking lower child poverty rates. 
Other considerations, such as the pursuit 
of fair opportunities for all children, make 
such a goal even more compelling.
Fortunately, New Zealand’s rate of 
child poverty is by no means the worst 
within the OECD (see Table 1). Moreover, 
the situation in 2013 is somewhat less 
serious than during the 1990s and early 
2000s (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, 
using various approaches to poverty 
measurement, whether based on relative 
income thresholds or on rates of material 
deprivation, child poverty in New 
Zealand remains a critical social problem. 
For instance, on one measure of income 
poverty (i.e. those living in households 
with equivalised3 disposable incomes 
below 60% of the median, after housing 
costs), the child poverty rate in recent 
years has been around 25%; this is almost 
twice the rate experienced during the 
1980s, which averaged about 13%. Using 
a more demanding poverty measure 
(based on 50% of the median household 
disposable income, after housing costs), 
whereas the average child poverty rate 
during the 1980s was about 8%, in 
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Introduction
New Zealand has tolerated significant levels of relative child 
poverty for more than two decades. For a country which once 
prided itself on being comparatively egalitarian and, more 
particularly, on being a great place to bring up children, this 
is surprising. It is also concerning. Child poverty imposes 
many long-term costs. This is especially the case, according 
to the available evidence, when poverty occurs during early 
childhood1 and when it is severe and/or persistent. These 
costs afflict not only the children directly exposed to poverty 
(e.g. in the form of lower educational achievement, reduced 
lifetime earnings and poorer health outcomes), but also 
society as a whole. The wider social and economic costs 
include increased health care costs, lower productivity
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recent years it has been close to 16%. As 
highlighted in Table 1, New Zealand’s 
rates of child poverty are somewhat lower 
if calculated without taking housing costs 
into account, but even on this basis they 
are close to double those of the best-
performing OECD countries. 
Furthermore, the rate of material 
deprivation4 among children, based on 
the official measure used by the European 
Union, was around 18% in 2008 (just 
prior to the global financial crisis). This 
was significantly higher than the rate in 
many western European countries and 
six times the rate of material deprivation 
among those aged 65 years and older (see 
Table 2).
International comparisons of this 
nature, together with the substantial 
rise in child poverty in New Zealand 
over the past 25 years, prompt a variety 
of questions. First, why do rates of child 
poverty and material deprivation vary 
so much across the OECD, and how 
have some countries managed to achieve 
relatively low rates for extended periods 
of time? Second, why did child poverty 
rates in New Zealand deteriorate so 
markedly during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and why have such significant rates 
been tolerated for so long? Third, how 
might the current rates of child poverty 
be reduced and, in particular, how might 
the durability or sustainability of such 
reductions be enhanced? This article seeks 
to answer these questions. My reflections 
draw heavily on the work of the Expert 
Advisory Group on Solutions to Child 
Poverty (EAG), of which I was co-chair.
There are, of course, many other 
issues deserving of attention. Many of 
these are covered in other contributions 
to this special issue of Policy Quarterly. 
Child poverty rates – explaining the 
differences between developed countries
The data presented in Table 1 highlight the 
large differences in rates of child poverty, 
based on relative poverty thresholds, 
across the OECD. Using the 60% poverty 
line, some countries (like Romania and the 
US) have rates up to three times those of 
the best-performing countries; using the 
50% poverty line the differences are even 
more marked. Material deprivation rates 
among children also vary greatly across 
the OECD, as indicated in Table 2. 
If child poverty rates were broadly 
similar across developed countries, 
it might suggest that policy settings 
make little difference. Decision-makers 
would then be faced with the stark and 
discouraging possibility that child poverty 
is an intractable problem and that the rate 
of child poverty is largely beyond their 
capacity to influence. Fortunately, the 
fact that rates differ so markedly suggests 
that policies do matter and that child 
poverty can be reduced. The question 
then becomes how? More specifically, 
which policies are the most effective and 
what conditions are necessary for their 
implementation? Also, what other factors 
shape poverty outcomes?
Differences in material deprivation rates
Unlike poverty rates based on relative 
income thresholds, material deprivation 
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Table 1: Child poverty rates at different relative poverty lines (before housing costs)
Country Poverty line at 
50%
Poverty line at 
40%
Poverty line at 
60%
Iceland 4.7 1.9 10.1
Finland 5.3 1.5 11.9
Cyprus 6.1 1.8 12.1
Netherlands 6.1 2.9 15.4
Norway 6.1 3.1 11.3
Slovenia 6.3 2.9 11.1
Denmark 6.5 3.6 11.4
Sweden 7.3 3.7 12.7
Austria 7.3 3.2 13.6
Czech Republic 7.4 3.8 13.0
Switzerland 8.1 3.2 17.9
Ireland 8.4 3.5 18.9
Germany 8.5 4.6 14.9
France 8.8 3.7 16.8
Malta 8.9 2.9 20.3
Belgium 10.2 4.1 16.6
Hungary 10.3 3.0 20.6
Australia 10.9 4.3 17.6
Slovakia 11.2 6.6 17.0
New Zealand 11.7 19.4
Estonia 11.9 6.1 20.6
United Kingdom 12.1 5.6 20.8
Luxembourg 12.3 4.2 22.4
Canada 13.3 7.3 21.9
Poland 14.5 7.5 22.9
Portugal 14.7 9.6 22.7
Japan 14.9 9.6 20.5
Lithuania 15.4 8.8 24.3
Italy 15.9 9.7 24.2
Greece 16.0 8.1 23.5
Spain 17.1 11.5 23.6
Bulgaria 17.8 12.2 24.4
Latvia 18.8 12.8 25.0
USA 23.1 16.6 31.1
Romania 25.5 17.8 32.3
Source: Innocenti Research Centre (2012, p.12)
Note: The rates cited in this table are generally for 2009, but the New Zealand rates are for 2011.
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(or hardship) rates reflect actual day-
to-day living conditions or standards. 
Accordingly, one would expect, other 
things being equal, that rates of childhood 
deprivation would be higher in countries 
with lower living standards than in those 
which are relatively wealthy. Thus, it is no 
surprise that deprivation rates (across all 
age groups) are much higher in eastern 
European countries like Hungary and 
Poland than in the richer countries of 
western Europe (see Table 2). But it is also 
clear that real per capita incomes supply 
only one of the reasons why deprivation 
rates differ. For instance, some countries 
with roughly comparable living standards 
as measured by GDP per capita (e.g. 
Germany and Sweden) have different 
childhood deprivation rates, and some 
countries with significant childhood 
deprivation rates (e.g. New Zealand and 
Britain) have very low rates of deprivation 
among those aged 65 years or more (e.g. 
3–5%). Interestingly, although rates of 
childhood deprivation (and income 
poverty) across the OECD are typically 
higher than those for the elderly (and the 
population as a whole), there are notable 
exceptions. Such findings suggest that 
there are a range of factors, not least policy 
settings, which affect rates of income 
poverty and material deprivation.
Differences in income poverty rates
As noted earlier, income poverty is 
measured on the basis of whether 
equivalised disposable household income 
is below a specified level of the median 
income (i.e. the mid-point in the income 
distribution, not the average). The 
poverty rate is thus a relative measure 
and will vary depending on the median 
income, the income threshold adopted, 
whether or not housing costs are taken 
into account (and, if so, how), and the 
nature of the equivalence scale adopted. 
The precise methodologies employed to 
calculate poverty rates are discussed by 
Bob Stephens elsewhere in this issue, but 
it is worth noting that disposable income 
refers to market income that is adjusted 
for direct taxes, income support (benefits) 
and tax credits. 
Plainly, measures of income 
poverty reflect the shape of the income 
distribution within a particular society 
(especially at the bottom end). While the 
relationship between income inequality 
(on various measures) and poverty is 
complex (see Carter et al. in this issue), 
broadly speaking, countries with high 
rates of income inequality (e.g. the 
US) tend to have relatively high rates 
of poverty, including child poverty. 
Conversely, countries with below-average 
levels of income inequality, like those in 
Scandinavia, tend to have lower poverty 
rates. 
The distribution of household dispos-
able income is influenced by many factors, 
most notably: 
• the dispersion of wages and other 
earnings from employment; 
• the dispersion of investment income 
(e.g. rents, dividends and interest) 
and private transfers;
• household structure (e.g. the balance 
of two-parent and sole-parent 
households, and the extent to which 
there is ‘assortative mating’5); 
• the degree of polarisation between 
‘job rich’ and ‘job poor’ households;
• the limited employment opportu-
nities for many unskilled and semi-
skilled people; and 
• the structure of direct taxes and the 
level of public cash transfers (e.g. 
pensions, benefit payments and tax 
credits). 
In brief, the significant variability in 
income poverty rates (including child 
poverty rates) across the OECD reflects 
differences in one or more of these factors, 
especially the dispersion of wages (and 
other earnings) and the structure and 
generosity of tax-welfare systems. Note, 
too, that poverty rates can be sensitive 
to relatively small movements (up or 
down) in levels of social assistance, as 
such changes can shift large numbers of 
Table 2: Deprivation rates* in 13 countries 
comparing children with older people and  
the total population in 2007 (Europe) and 
2008 (New Zealand)
Country Children 
0-17
Aged 
65+
Total 
population
Netherlands 6 3 6
Norway 6 1 5
Sweden 7 3 6
Spain 9 11 11
Germany 13 7 13
Slovenia 13 18 14
Ireland 14 4 11
United 
Kingdom
15 5 10
New Zealand 18 3 13
Italy 18 14 14
Czech 
Republic
20 17 20
Hungary 42 35 38
Poland 39 41 44
* The deprivation rates in this table are based on the 
proportion of households who lack at least three items from 
a list of nine because they cannot afford them. All nine items 
are regarded as essential by the majority of the population.
Source: Perry, 2009, pp30-33
Figure 1: Trends in New Zealand child poverty rates from 1982 to 2011 (based on 
50% and 60% of median disposable household income, after housing costs)
Source:  Perry, 2012, 124 
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households above or below particular 
poverty thresholds. Specific policy settings, 
therefore, can have a significant impact on 
rates of income poverty. 
As a general rule, the countries with 
low rates of relative child poverty (such as 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden) have rates of market-income 
inequality below the OECD average, and/
or tax-welfare systems that are relatively 
effective at redistributing income to those 
in low-income households (Cass and 
Whiteford, 2009; Whiteford and Adema, 
2006). For instance, child poverty rates in 
the US are high because market-income 
disparities are substantial and the tax-
welfare system is not very effective in 
redistributing income between house-
holds. By contrast, Canada has a broadly 
similar level of market-income inequality 
(i.e. before taxes and transfers) to that of 
the US, but the tax-welfare system is much 
more effective in redistributing income to 
poorer households (OECD, 2011a, p.36). 
Hence, whereas child poverty rates (using 
a threshold of 50% of median household 
disposable incomes before housing costs) 
in Canada and the US are roughly the 
same before taxes and transfers are taken 
into account, after they are factored into 
the equation, Canada’s child poverty rate 
falls to almost half that of the US (see 
Table 1). 
Options for reducing child poverty
Such an analysis suggests that there are two 
broad strategies available for reducing the 
proportion of households with disposable 
incomes below key poverty thresholds and 
thereby alleviate child poverty: the first 
is to focus on reducing market-income 
inequality, especially on a household basis; 
the second is to enhance the redistributive 
effectiveness of the tax-welfare system. 
The first option is the more complex 
and difficult of the two. Market-income 
inequality is affected by many different 
variables and few of these are amenable 
to the direct control of policy makers. 
Such variables include: the overall 
structure of the economy and patterns of 
employment in different sectors; labour 
market mobility and participation rates; 
the structure of employment, including 
working-time arrangements; the nature 
of labour market institutions, including 
union density and bargaining coverage; 
the framework of labour market 
regulation, including the minimum wage; 
benefit replacement rates; unemployment 
rates; and cultural values. Over recent 
decades there has been a general tendency 
across the OECD for market-income 
inequality to increase, but the reasons for 
this, as well as possible solutions, remain 
contested (see OECD, 2011a; Stiglitz, 
2012). Similarly, there is continuing debate 
about why the rise in inequality has been 
so uneven between countries.
Aside from this, social factors that are 
not necessarily related to the structure 
of the economy or the labour market 
also shape the dispersion of household 
incomes. One of these is the proportion of 
sole-parent households. On average, sole-
parent households have lower disposable 
incomes than two-parent households. This 
reflects the fact that: 1) such households 
have only one working-age adult; 2) both 
education and employment levels, and 
thus potential earnings, tend to be lower; 
and 3) many sole parents are (largely) 
dependent on cash transfers and other 
forms of public assistance. Accordingly, 
child poverty rates among sole-parent 
households are invariably higher within 
OECD countries than among two-parent 
households. Likewise, other things being 
equal, countries with comparatively high 
rates of sole parenthood have greater 
child poverty than those with low rates 
of sole parenthood. Having said this, the 
picture is complicated by the fact that 
the employment rates (and earnings) 
of sole parents vary significantly across 
the OECD and some countries provide 
relatively generous assistance to sole-
parent families. Hence, for instance, 
although the rate of sole parenthood 
in Scandinavia is close to or above the 
OECD average, child poverty rates 
are nonetheless low. This is because 
the Nordic countries provide strong 
incentives for sole parents to find paid 
employment and supply considerable 
financial support to enable participation 
in the labour market (e.g. via heavily 
subsidised child care and early childhood 
education). Achieving high parental 
employment levels is thus a critical 
mechanism for minimising child poverty. 
This applies even in a context where the 
wage dispersion is considerable.
The second broad option for 
reducing child poverty is to enhance the 
redistributive effectiveness of the tax-
welfare system, particularly in relation 
to low-income families. Many factors 
affect the redistributive effectiveness of 
government policies, including: 
• the structure, comprehensiveness and 
progressivity of the tax system; 
• the overall level of taxes; 
• the comprehensiveness and 
generosity of the welfare/social 
security system, including the design 
of family assistance programmes 
and the level of benefit payments/tax 
credits; 
• the eligibility criteria for benefit 
receipt; 
• the balance and structure of in-work 
and out-of-work benefits; and 
• the nature and generosity of social 
assistance which is tied to the 
provision of specific goods and 
services (e.g. cash subsidies for 
housing and child care). 
On the whole, the OECD countries 
that are most effective in redistributing 
income combine relatively progressive 
tax regimes with comprehensive and 
generous social security/social assistance 
regimes. With respect to reducing child 
poverty, key ingredients typically include 
strong parental employment incentives 
and related supports, significant family 
assistance programmes (in the form 
... countries with comparatively high rates of sole 
parenthood have greater child poverty than those 
with low rates of sole parenthood.
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of tax credits and/or child payments), 
and benefit systems that are designed to 
ensure that household disposable incomes 
are above (or at least not too far below) 
poverty-related thresholds. Interestingly, 
the countries with the lowest rates of child 
poverty generally rely quite heavily on 
universal (i.e. non-means-tested) forms 
of social assistance to families.
Additionally, governments across the 
OECD provide many ‘in-kind’ services 
for children (and their families), such 
as education (at all levels), health care, 
housing and care services. Although these 
are not designed primarily as instruments 
for redistribution, their effect is typically 
strongly redistributive.6 Hence, while in-
kind services do not directly impact on 
the inequality of household disposable 
incomes (or income poverty rates), they 
do affect rates of material deprivation 
(e.g. the affordability of and access to 
health care services) and overall levels 
of societal inequality. The nature, 
comprehensiveness and generosity of 
in-kind services must therefore be taken 
into account in designing strategies 
to alleviate child poverty and material 
deprivation.
Achieving low rates of child poverty – 
political economy considerations
It is one thing to identify possible 
strategies, and related policy frameworks, 
for minimising child poverty; it is quite 
another to implement them and sustain 
the required political support over long 
periods of time. After all, reducing child 
poverty entails policy interventions 
that redistribute income in various 
ways, and redistributive initiatives are 
inherently controversial. Not only are 
they subject to (potentially ongoing) 
ideological opposition and taxpayer 
resistance, but there is also the perennial 
challenge of conflicting policy priorities 
and fiscal constraints. Hence, if effective 
strategies to alleviate child poverty are 
to be implemented successfully, and 
if they are also to endure, the relevant 
policies require ongoing multi-party 
endorsement at the parliamentary level 
and adequate, stable levels of public 
support. This implies the need for a broad 
societal commitment to particular values 
(e.g. a strong emphasis on social justice 
and social solidarity, a preference for low 
levels of poverty, support for childbearing 
and gender equity, a recognition that the 
state has a legitimate role in encouraging 
family well-being and protecting the 
best interests of children, and so forth). 
Supportive institutional arrangements are 
also likely to assist (e.g. an interest group 
structure that reinforces the predominant 
societal values and preferences). Achieving 
the necessary consensus appears to be 
easier in societies which are relatively 
homogeneous (especially on the crucial 
dimensions of ethnicity and religion) 
and have comparatively high rates of 
social mobility. By contrast, societies 
characterised by deep and entrenched 
social divisions (such as the US) are less 
likely to secure or sustain any agreement 
on anti-poverty strategies.
Adept policy design is also crucial if low 
child poverty rates are to be achieved and 
maintained. For instance, the main anti-
poverty policies need to be constructed 
so that they are not undermined by 
inflation, the inevitable ups and downs 
of the business cycle or negative external 
shocks. Maintaining relatively low 
unemployment levels, as well as high 
labour force participation rates by those 
with children, is equally crucial; ultimately 
this depends on successful macroeconomic 
management. Additionally, it is helpful, 
in terms of maintaining cross-party 
support for low rates of child poverty, 
to incorporate measures which: a) are 
politically difficult to change because of 
the likely electoral costs; and b) ensure 
support across the ideological spectrum. 
In this respect, embracing policies with 
at least some universal coverage appears 
to be important as this tends to enhance 
middle-class support for the overall 
strategy.
Thus far, only Scandinavia and a 
limited number of continental European 
countries (e.g. Austria and the Nether-
lands) have been successful in achieving 
and maintaining low child poverty rates. 
At the same time, over recent decades 
various other OECD countries have made 
concerted efforts for extended periods to 
reduce child poverty (e.g. Australia, 
Ireland, Italy and the UK). These anti-
poverty strategies have generally been 
initiated by centre-left governments but 
have often received a solid level of support 
from parties across the political spectrum. 
In policy terms, such strategies have 
usually incorporated a mix of elements, 
including: 
• explicit and generally ambitious 
medium-to-long-term poverty-
reduction targets or high-level 
political pledges; 
• additional cash transfers to families 
(both working and non-working), 
typically involving a mix of universal 
and targeted elements; 
• various measures to enhance the 
employment of sole parents and 
improve the flexibility of working 
hours; and 
• additional investments in children 
(e.g. via extra subsidies for child 
care and early childhood education, 
longer paid maternity leave, more 
funding for schools in poorer areas, 
and improved social support for 
young mothers) (Cass and Whiteford, 
2009; Waldfogel, 2010). 
In the case of the UK, a particular focus 
of the former Labour government’s anti-
poverty strategy was on assisting families 
with young children (e.g. 0–5 years) so that 
the youngest children receive benefits at 
least equal in value (or higher) than older 
children. This approach is consistent with 
...only Scandinavia and a limited number of 
continental European countries (e.g. Austria  
and the Netherlands) have been successful in 
achieving and maintaining low child poverty rates.  
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international evidence which highlights 
the importance of avoiding persistent and/
or severe poverty during early childhood. 
Explaining the rise and acceptance of child 
poverty in New Zealand
As noted earlier, New Zealand moved 
from having relatively low rates of child 
poverty in the early to mid-1980s to much 
higher rates during the 1990s and into the 
2000s. The dramatic rise during the late 
1980s and early 1990s was the product of a 
convergence of factors. Two were especially 
important: 1) a substantial increase in those 
receiving social assistance (due to much 
higher unemployment and an increase 
in the number of sole parents and those 
receiving sickness and invalids benefits); 
and 2) a substantial reduction in the real 
value of welfare benefits. For instance, 
between 1987 and 1992 the number of 
beneficiaries almost doubled while many 
benefits were cut by 10–30% in real terms. 
The combined impact of these changes 
was to reduce the disposable incomes of 
many families below one or other of the 
various poverty thresholds. 
The increase in child poverty between 
the mid-1980s and the early 2000s was 
also exacerbated by other policy changes 
and wider economic and social trends. 
These included:
• an increase in the dispersion of 
wages and other earnings from 
employment; 
• an increase in the dispersion of 
investment income (e.g. rents, 
dividends and interest) and private 
transfers (see OECD, 2011a, overview, 
p.35);
• changes in household structure, 
and, in particular, an increase 
in the proportion of sole-parent 
households; 
• a reduction in the progressivity of 
the tax system;
• an increase in relative housing costs 
(partly due to policy changes); and
• a reduction in the real value of family 
assistance programmes – partly 
due to a failure to index fully some 
forms of assistance (e.g. various tax 
credit initiatives, primary health care 
subsidies, etc.).
In response to the dramatic increase in 
child poverty during the early 1990s, 
some modest policy changes occurred 
during the latter part of the National-led 
government (1990–99), including a small 
increase in the level of family assistance. 
No reversal of the 1991 benefits cuts, 
however, was instituted. Under the 
subsequent Labour-led government (1999–
2008) more significant redistributive 
policy initiatives were introduced, most 
notably in the form of extra housing 
assistance (including income-related rents 
for state house tenants and changes to the 
accommodation supplement) and the 
implementation of Working for Families 
during 2005–07. The latter involved a 
revised and expanded package of tax credits 
for low- to middle-income families. These 
measures, together with a substantial 
fall in the level of unemployment and a 
more modest reduction in those receiving 
the domestic purposes benefit, brought 
a significant reduction in child poverty 
rates between 2004 and 2008 (see Figure 
1). Much of this reduction, however, was 
concentrated in ‘job rich’ households. 
This is because most job poor households 
were not eligible for the new in-work tax 
credit (IWTC), which replaced the former 
child tax credit in April 2006. The IWTC 
was designed to enhance labour force 
participation rates, especially among sole 
parents, by providing additional work-
related financial incentives. The IWTC 
has, however, remained controversial, 
partly because of certain design features 
and partly because of the inevitable 
distinction that is made between families 
with different levels of engagement with 
the labour market (see the contribution of 
St John in this issue of Policy Quarterly).
Despite these anti-poverty measures, 
child poverty rates (on most indicators) 
have remained significantly above their 
levels during the 1980s for over two 
decades. Why have such levels of poverty 
been tolerated? 
Any suggestion that the reason 
lies in insufficient empirical evidence 
or inadequate advocacy is difficult to 
sustain. Although New Zealand does not 
have official poverty measures, reliable 
poverty data have been published by 
the Ministry of Social Development and 
various academic researchers over many 
years. Abundant international and local 
data have also been available on the 
negative educational, health, social and 
economic consequences of higher child 
poverty rates. Thus, policy makers in New 
Zealand cannot plead ignorance about 
the nature, extent and likely impacts of 
child poverty. Likewise, there has been 
no lack of articulate and well-informed 
public advocacy. Alleviating child poverty 
has been vigorously championed for 
many years by numerous professional 
bodies (especially in the health care 
sector), community groups and voluntary 
organisations (such as the Child Poverty 
Action Group), as well as several minor 
parliamentary parties. Of course, this 
has not prevented much ignorance and 
denial. Nor has it precluded numerous 
misunderstandings and myths about 
child poverty from holding sway (e.g. that 
there is no ‘real’ hardship in New Zealand; 
that child poverty is a minor problem 
and/or does little harm; that there is little 
that the government can do to improve 
the situation, etc.). But there has been no 
shortage of empirical evidence available 
to counter such myths.
The reasons for New Zealand’s 
tolerance of significant child poverty for 
an extended period must therefore lie 
elsewhere. Three separate but interrelated 
explanations can be identified: the 
dominance of market-liberal ideas; the 
Although New Zealand does not have official poverty 
measures, reliable poverty data have been published 
by the Ministry of Social Development and various 
academic researchers over many years.
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related weakening of egalitarian values; 
and the tendency for the problem of child 
poverty to be ‘framed’ in public discourse 
as a minority ethnic group issue.
Ideologically, a strong market-liberal 
ethos prevailed within the country’s 
policy community, and especially its most 
influential policy-making institutions, 
during the 1980s and 1990s. While this 
ethos has weakened more recently, the 
dominant policy concern has remained 
focused on enhancing economic 
growth and lifting labour productivity 
rather than achieving greater equity or 
reducing poverty. Further, the prevailing 
orthodoxy has continued to embrace the 
following assumptions: that boosting 
economic growth requires a smaller, 
less active state; that for a small, open 
economy in the context of economic 
globalisation and liberalisation, greater 
income inequality is inevitable (if not 
desirable); and that benefit rates need to 
be kept low to maintain adequate work 
incentives and reduce dependence on the 
state. From this perspective, higher rates 
of poverty, including child poverty, are 
viewed as a largely unavoidable (short-
term) by-product of the focus on growth. 
It is assumed that eventually, however, 
faster growth will expand employment 
opportunities and reduce poverty rates, 
certainly among families with paid 
employment. Such assumptions and 
perspectives have been reinforced by a 
mix of paternalistic attitudes and anti-
statist sentiments. Examples include the 
views that childrearing is solely a parental 
responsibility, that the state should not 
interfere in family matters, that child 
poverty is the result of deficient parenting, 
that the best solution is for poor people 
not to have children, and that ‘throwing 
more money at the problem’ doesn’t 
work.
Related to this, opinion poll data 
indicate that there has been a steady 
decline in support for egalitarian values 
in New Zealand over the past three 
decades. As a result, there is now a 
greater acceptance of income inequality 
and relative poverty and less support 
for income redistribution. For instance, 
whereas in 1992 around 70% of those 
surveyed endorsed a progressive tax system 
(with those on high incomes paying a 
greater proportion of their income in 
taxes than low-income earners), by 1999 
support had fallen to 60%, and by 2009 
to just over 50% (International Social 
Survey Programme, 2010). Likewise, 
the proportion of New Zealanders who 
support government measures to reduce 
income differences between the rich and 
poor fell from 50% in 1992 to 40% in 
2009, and there was a similar reduction 
in the proportion of people who thought 
income disparities were too large. Related 
to this, less than half the population 
(43%) agreed in 2009 that the government 
should provide a decent standard of living 
for those who are unemployed. In short, 
increased inequality in New Zealand has 
gone hand in hand with a shift in values; 
the once broad and vigorous support 
for egalitarianism has been significantly 
eroded. Similarly, increased inequality, 
coupled with greater socio-economic 
residential segregation, has no doubt 
reduced the extent to which wealthy 
citizens experience and understand the 
problems which afflict the poor. For 
instance, children brought up in well-
off households in affluent suburbs have 
virtually no direct experience of material 
deprivation or hardship. Their living 
circumstances are far removed from the 
substantial deprivation experienced by 
children brought up in households with 
the lowest 10–20% of living standards 
(Perry, 2011, p.14). 
Finally, there is the issue of policy 
‘framing’. I am speculating here, but 
I suspect that ethnic considerations, 
and related demographic trends, have 
contributed to the failure of policy 
makers to take more decisive action to 
reduce child poverty. Around 50% of 
poor children in New Zealand are wholly 
or partly of Mäori or Pasifika ethnicities, 
and child poverty rates among such 
groups are at least twice those of the 
European population on most measures 
(Perry, 2012). Not surprisingly, therefore, 
child poverty tends to be associated in 
the public mind with minority groups, 
and thus identified as a minority ethnic 
problem rather than a broader societal 
issue. Such perceptions, coupled no 
doubt with elements of racism and 
negative attitudes to sole parents, may 
have contributed to an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
attitude among some European voters and 
decision-makers. From this perspective, 
child poverty is viewed as ‘their’ problem, 
not ‘our’ problem; poor children are seen 
as ‘their’ children, not ‘ours’. Consistent 
with this, a notable refrain from certain 
members of the public during the 
consultations undertaken by the Expert 
Advisory Group on Solutions to Child 
Poverty in 2012 was the need to ‘stop 
them breeding’.
If the policy problem is framed in such 
ways, many people might well conclude 
that child poverty is an issue for the Mäori 
or Pasifika communities to address, not 
one for society as a whole. Likewise, if 
child poverty is seen as solely the result 
of bad choices by certain individuals 
(e.g. poor parents are having too many 
children), then the case for action by the 
state to alleviate the problem may appear 
less strong. 
Parallels can readily be drawn with 
other countries which have deprived 
ethnic minorities, like the US (where 
child poverty is concentrated especially 
in the black and Latino communities). 
It is perhaps no accident, therefore, that 
as demographic changes have altered the 
ethnic composition of the population and 
as poverty has become more entrenched 
within certain ethnic minorities, there 
Around 50% of poor children in New Zealand are 
wholly or partly of Ma-ori or Pasifika ethnicities,  
and child poverty rates among such groups are  
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has been a corresponding reduction in 
public support for policy measures to 
address child poverty. 
A way forward: reducing child poverty in 
New Zealand
To the extent that such an analysis has 
merit, how might progress be made 
towards alleviating child poverty in New 
Zealand, not just temporarily but on a 
long-term basis? Let me offer several 
suggestions.
Building robust, durable, public 
and parliamentary support for the 
implementation of effective anti-
poverty measures will be critical. This 
is currently lacking. Generating the 
necessary support will require both 
astute political leadership and stronger 
electoral incentives for policy action. 
The latter, in turn, will require a shift 
in public attitudes, particularly among 
better-off New Zealanders. To achieve 
this, prudent use of all three Aristotelian 
forms of persuasion might help: logos 
(the use of logic), ethos (appeals to 
authority and ethical considerations) 
and pathos (appeals to the emotions). In 
practical terms, effective persuasion will 
entail continuing efforts by researchers 
and community groups to highlight the 
empirical evidence regarding the long-
term economic and social costs of child 
poverty; to underscore the harmful 
impacts of poverty on individual children; 
to emphasise the shame of tolerating 
significant childhood deprivation in the 
midst of plenty; to counter the manifold 
myths and misunderstandings noted 
earlier; and to reframe the policy problem 
so that child poverty is not perceived 
solely or primarily as a Mäori and/or 
Pasifika concern, but rather as an issue 
about the rights, opportunities and well-
being of all children, regardless of their 
ethnic background. 
More generally, greater public support 
is needed for effective redistributive policy 
initiatives and the values which underpin 
such approaches. In this regard, a focus 
on child poverty, rather than family 
poverty, is likely to be more conducive 
to capturing the public imagination. 
Emphasising the expected long-term 
national economic benefits of lower rates 
of child poverty might also help. After all, 
reduced poverty is not merely about less 
hardship and expanded opportunities for 
deprived children (however critical this 
might be); it is also about enhancing the 
nation’s prosperity. The message needs to 
be clear: child poverty benefits no one; 
less poverty means better outcomes and a 
more secure future for everyone, not just 
the poor. Equally, the focus should not be 
on the costs of poverty relief (although 
these are undeniable), but on the wisdom 
of investing in our collective future.
In policy terms, a package of initiatives 
is needed which has the capacity to attract 
cross-party support. Moreover, such 
support needs to be durable over multiple 
elections. As highlighted by the EAG, 
New Zealand has much to learn from the 
experience of other countries that have 
pursued successful strategies to reduce 
child poverty (see OECD, 2009, 2011b). 
Such strategies have typically embraced 
a balanced combination of measures that 
appeal to a range of political interests. 
They have also been designed both to 
relieve poverty and to mitigate its effects. 
The strategies include (as noted earlier): 
• explicit (and ideally credible and 
achievable) medium- to longer-term 
poverty-reduction targets to ensure 
clarity of purpose and accountability 
for results;
• the specification of clear objectives 
for the reduction of various negative 
social outcomes associated with child 
poverty;7
• prudent fiscal and other macro-
economic policies to maximise the 
chances of high employment levels;
• active labour market policies to 
enable and support high partici-
pation rates, and in particular to 
reduce joblessness among families 
with children, not least sole parents; 
• a mix of cash assistance and in-kind 
policies; 
• a mix of universal and targeted 
assistance for families with children; 
and
• levels of income support (via cash 
benefits and tax credits) that are 
sufficient to ensure that most low-
income families receive disposable 
incomes above relevant poverty 
thresholds. 
There is, of course, much scope for debate 
about the precise design of such policy 
instruments, as well as the inevitably 
problematic issues of prioritisation, 
sequencing and affordability. The 
EAG in its final report made no fewer 
than 78 specific recommendations. 
Of these, six were identified as short-
term priorities, and a further four as 
long-term priorities. While some of the 
priority recommendations have attracted 
a measure of support from across the 
political spectrum, others certainly have 
not. This is hardly surprising, not least 
because of the substantial fiscal costs 
of implementing several of the more 
ambitious longer-term policy measures.
As expected, the most controversial of 
the EAG’s recommendations were those 
proposing a greater reliance on universal 
forms of social assistance, especially 
during the early years of a child’s life.8 
This is not the place for a detailed defence 
of the approach enunciated by the EAG. 
But various matters deserve stressing. 
First, the policy debate in New Zealand 
needs to move beyond a simplistic either/
or approach to universality and targeting. 
The policy terrain is much more 
complicated than this and many policy 
options (and sub-options) are available. 
These include what the 2010 Marmot 
Review (which focused on how to reduce 
... the most controversial of the EAG’s 
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health inequalities in England) termed 
‘proportionate universalism’ and what 
Theda Skocpol has referred to a ‘targeting 
within universalism’ (Mkandawire, 2005, 
p.17). Second, and related to this, the 
debate needs to be informed by careful, 
sober, rigorous analysis and the avoidance 
of knee-jerk reactions or ideologically-
driven rigidity. Third, it is vital to 
consider the coherence of the overall 
policy package, not merely the integrity 
and logic of the individual components. 
And fourth, while the aggregate fiscal 
costs of the various options are a critically 
important consideration, they should not 
receive absolute or overriding priority. 
Other criteria also need appropriate 
weighting, including feasibility, simplicity, 
compliance costs, political durability, and 
the effectiveness of the interventions in 
meeting their multiple objectives.
To sum up, there are compelling 
ethical, economic and social reasons 
for reducing child poverty rates in New 
Zealand. Fortunately, policy makers have 
the means to do so, at least to some 
degree. Unfortunately, the political will 
and incentives appear to be lacking. The 
challenge, therefore, must be to change 
the political climate, ideally in a durable 
manner. This will not be an easy or 
straightforward task. Nevertheless, for 
the sake of all those children who deserve 
a better start in life, it is undoubtedly a 
task worth pursuing – with intelligence, 
persuasiveness and vigour.  
1 See the contribution by Greg Duncan and Katherine 
Magnuson in this issue of Policy Quarterly.
2 For further details, see the various working papers and 
reports produced by the Expert Advisory Group on Solutions 
to Child Poverty: http://www.occ.org.nz/publications/child_
poverty.
3 This means that adjustments are made for the size and 
composition of the households.
4 Deprivation rates provide more direct indications of hardship 
than income-based measures of poverty, and are typically 
based on the proportion of households which lack a certain 
number of items (that are deemed by the majority of the 
population to be essential) because they cannot afford them.
5 Assortative mating is a non-random partnering pattern 
in which individuals with similar backgrounds (including 
education, socio-economic status and beliefs) mate with one 
another more frequently than what would be expected under 
a random mating pattern.
6 There are a few exceptions to this generalisation, the most 
obvious being large universal subsidies for post-compulsory 
education (which are regressive). 
7 The EAG recommended that the government develop a 
comprehensive set of child poverty-related indicators 
(CPRIs), with explicit targets for at least some of these 
CPRIs.
8 For a critique, see the contribution of Susan St John in this 
issue of Policy Quarterly.
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Corrections to note:
Two errors occurred in the article by Geoff Bertram and David Tripe in the 
November 2012 issue of Policy Quarterly. First, the reference to ‘Hosking 
and Wollford 2011’ ought to have been ‘Hoskin and Woolford 2011’. Second, 
the attribution of the 2012 Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) to the 
Treasury was wrong; in fact the RIS was prepared by the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, although it appeared on the Treasury website. The ‘Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand’ should therefore have appeared as the author of the 
‘Regulatory Impact Statement: covered bonds registration requirements 
and insolvency protections’.
